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ABSTRACT 
This undergraduate thesis examines how to measure the influence of the Evo Morales 
administration’s decolonization policies on the social inclusion of indigenous peoples in Bolivia. 
Given the ongoing colonial legacy of exclusion of indigenous peoples in Bolivia, the Morales 
administration has created a national agenda to decolonize the state and improve conditions for 
the marginalized, oppressed, and excluded indigenous peoples. In examining the nacionalización 
de los hidrocarburos, the ley de la reconducción comunitaria y reforma agraria, the plan 
nacional de desarrollo, the ley de la educación, the ley de deslinde, the ley de marco de 
autonomías, and TIPNIS, in combination with decolonization theory and previous studies, this 
thesis seeks to link the relationship between decolonization policy and social inclusion, as well 
as uncover certain contradictions between the government’s rhetoric and practice and encourage 
future research. While the Morales administration appears to have made progress towards 
decolonization and social inclusion, it has also implemented policies that contradict these efforts.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The effects of colonization are still very present in postcolonial societies. The current 
conditions of Latin America are proof that colonialism has an ongoing historical legacy of 
ethnicity and racism, one that does not end after formal independence but “continues in the form 
of a social-cultural hierarchy of European and non-European” (Quijano and Wallerstein, 1992). 
During the conquest of the Americas, the Spaniards implemented a caste system in the New 
World. In this system, identities were simplified to españoles, criollos, mestizos, indios, negros, 
and mulatos. According to Anibal Quijano’s concept, “coloniality of power,” this racial 
categorization established a discriminatory discourse that was reflected in colonial structures and 
institutions and continues in the institutions and structures of postcolonial societies.  
As a result, even after independence the “barbaric” and “uncivilized” perceptions of the 
indios remained and the “sociocultural complexes” of indigenous peoples were still perceived as 
an expression of “backwardness.” Often times, the indigenous cultures were blamed for the 
country’s lack of “civilization”. In Bolivia, even indigenous tribute persisted until the early 
twentieth century. Additionally, throughout Latin America, many liberal governments created 
policies that aimed to include the indigenous peoples in national life but exclude their cultures, 
attempting to erase their “differentiated identities” from the national identity (Polanco, 1997). 
Unfortunately, these sentiments continue to exist today and indigenous peoples still make up the 
most excluded group in Latin America, facing discrimination with regard to basic rights to land, 
language, culture, governance, and social services. 
 The more we learn about this legacy of colonization, the more glaring the need for 
decolonization becomes. While decolonization is commonly understood as, “the end of formal 
political, economic, and military control of a colonized territory by another power,” for this 
study, decolonization will refer to a more far reaching process that occurs within an independent 
nation, undoing the legacies of colonization, and in particular increasing social inclusion for 
indigenous peoples (Crawford, 2002). While no country has successfully decolonized, the 
ongoing effects of colonization demand a political project to reimagine and recreate decolonized 
national spaces, and Bolivia’s political efforts to decolonize are worthy of further examination.  
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Bolivia, initially colonized by the Spanish in the sixteenth century, continues to suffer the 
consequences of colonization. Despite the fact that the majority of the population identifies as 
indigenous, indigenous peoples are still exploited, marginalized, and excluded. However, unlike 
most postcolonial societies, Bolivia’s current administration, the Morales administration, has 
created a national agenda aimed at decolonizing the state. Today, Bolivia’s first indigenous 
president, Evo Morales, of the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Toward Socialism, MAS), 
though a widely controversial political figure, is almost universally credited with recovering 
indigenous identity. He is also often commended for improving conditions for indigenous 
peoples, particularly those living in rural areas. If the advances of the Morales administration are 
the result of its decolonization policies, one would expect to observe increased social inclusion 
for indigenous peoples in Bolivia. Social inclusion refers to “the process of improving the terms 
for individuals and groups to take part in society” (World Bank, 2013). Given colonization’s 
historical legacy of social exclusion, decolonization policy should logically bring about the 
increased social inclusion of the colonized.  
While little has been done to measure the social inclusion of indigenous peoples in 
Bolivia, social exclusion does confirm poverty, and some studies have measured poverty among 
indigenous peoples. In 1994, a World Bank study demonstrated that there is a significant 
relationship between being poor and being indigenous in Bolivia. The frequency of poverty 
among indigenous peoples living in urban areas was about fifteen percent higher than that of 
nonindigenous peoples. Additionally, on the national level, 73.5% of the indigenous population 
was living under the poverty line with 37% of them living in extreme poverty, and the poverty 
gap between the indigenous and nonindigenous population only worsened between 1997 and 
2002 (Gigler, 2009). Unfortunately, measuring the poverty of indigenous peoples does not 
capture the whole picture. Since the election of Evo Morales in 2006, no studies have sought to 
measure the social inclusion of indigenous peoples, nor the effect of his administration’s 
decolonization policies on the social inclusion of indigenous peoples. Due to the lack of data 
available, it is beyond the scope of this paper to empirically examine whether the policies of the 
Evo Morales administration have increased social inclusion. Instead, this thesis discusses how 
one can begin to measure the influence of decolonization policies on the social inclusion of 
indigenous peoples in Bolivia, in turn, laying the groundwork for future study and analysis.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
Since there has been a significant amount of literature produced in the fields of subaltern 
and postcolonial studies, the following is only a snapshot of a vast body of literature. However, it 
does include several prominent thinkers like Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, 
Mahatma Gandhi, Paulo Freire, Walter Mignolo, and Enrique Dussel, among others. This 
literature review first aims to provide its readers with a general understanding of decolonization 
theory and to establish the relevance of decolonization in postcolonial societies. Secondly, it 
presents different approaches to decolonization, mainly psychological, economic, and 
educational methods. Lastly, this literature review seeks to establish that the social exclusion of 
the colonized is a consequence of colonization and, therefore, the social inclusion of the 
colonized should be an outcome of decolonization.  
Decolonization theory  
Decolonization theory has its roots in the work of Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, and 
Gayatri Spivak. First, Fanon’s discussion of decolonization, which focuses on the national war 
for liberation in Algeria, is foundational for decolonization theory. In Wretched of the Earth, 
Fanon (2004) identifies compartmentalization, the reduction of identities to fit a “simple and 
opposed dichotomy,” as a notable result of colonization that requires “undoing.” In Algeria, like 
in most of the colonized world, relations were reduced to the colonizers and the colonized. The 
colonizers established the colonized identity and employed it to dehumanize and exclude the 
colonized. Since colonial institutions keep the colonized in submission, these two distinct 
“species” or “races” continue to divide the world, resulting in continued exclusion for the 
colonized.  
In another one of his works, Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon (2008) explains that this 
colonial division has certain psychological impacts. Given the efforts of the colonizer to destroy 
the culture of the colonized, often times the colonized loses his or her native culture and adopts 
that of the colonizer. Regrettably, as the colonized tries to appropriate the culture of the 
colonizer, the colonized can develop an inferiority complex. Fanon explains that since the white 
colonizers have perpetuated an association of “blackness” with “wrongness,” “A normal Negro 
child, having grown up within a normal family, will become abnormal on the slightest contact 
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with the white world.” This association begins at an early age and is further perpetuated by the 
media’s representation of black people as villains (Fanon, 2008). Decolonization, as a result, 
calls for the creation of a new people, free from submission and inferiority (Fanon, 2004). This, 
in turn, should result in the social inclusion of the colonized.  
Fanon (2004) further argues that for decolonization to occur, the “ruling species’” or the 
colonizers’ economy, lifestyle, and culture must be destroyed violently and be replaced by that of 
the colonized. When this violent process is complete, the colonized “thing” transforms into a 
liberated man. He justifies violence, noting that if the colonizers do not treat the colonized like 
human beings, then the colonized should not be obliged to treat the colonizers with the morals 
and principles assigned to humanity (Fanon, 2004). Fanon also rationalizes this violent process 
in his discussion of national culture, in which he establishes three phases. During the first phase, 
the “superiority” of European culture is used to justify conquest and colonialism. In this phase, 
national culture is “a culture under interrogation whose destruction is sought systematically.” In 
the second phase, national culture produces anti-colonialism. However, only in the third phase, 
after the violent, national liberation struggle, is the “demise of colonialism” achieved and 
nationhood produced. Fanon asserts that violence is necessary because nationalism and 
revolution can produce culture but culture cannot produce nationalism and revolution.  
While Fanon wrote about formal decolonization, Edward Said (1979), the father of 
postcolonial studies, speaks of decolonization in a postcolonial society, examining the ongoing 
legacies of colonization. Oftentimes, even after the colonial power is overthrown, much of the 
colonial structures and institutions are maintained, and therefore the exclusion of the colonized 
continues. In his work Orientalism, Edward Said builds off of Fanon’s understanding of 
compartmentalization. He defines “Orientalism” as the collection of false assumptions, largely 
influenced by colonial and imperial motives, that have shaped Western attitudes towards the 
Middle East. The “Occident” assumes that it must represent the voiceless, “Orient.” In other 
words, in the eyes of the West, the Orient was destined to be ruled and dominated. This prejudice 
is a result of the existing colonizing discourse. Since the media continues to promote the Orient 
as an inferior being, racism is sustained. However, Said does not view this discourse as fixed. 
Instead, he questions the notion that the Orient was biologically inferior to the European and 
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incapable of self-governance. Even though discourse can reinforce colonial power, it can also be 
mobilized to resist colonial power.  
In one of the most influential texts of postcolonial theory, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” 
Gayatri Spivak (1988) expands on this discussion. This time in the context of India, she notes 
that those that have the power to speak, the Westerners, speak for those who cannot, the 
subaltern. Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist coined the term, subaltern to refer to the 
populations that are denied a voice in society and socially and politically excluded from its 
institutions. Spivak’s discussion centers on the white man’s barbaric discourse surrounding sati, 
the practice whereby the widow kills herself, often on her husband’s pyre, shortly after his death, 
the practice that the British used to justify imperialism. While Spivak does not necessarily 
condone the practice, she does take issue with the idea that the privileged, white man could save 
the subaltern, the “brown women.” She explains, that white men are not “saving brown women 
from brown men,” but silencing the subaltern (Spivak, 1988). Decolonization, therefore, first 
requires that the subaltern speak and are heard.  
Decolonization of the mind 
While most scholars agree on the relevance and need for decolonization, many key 
thinkers often disagree with Fanon’s notion that violence is necessary for decolonization to 
occur. Wilson and Yellow Bird (2010), for example, focus on decolonization of the mind, “the 
intelligent, calculated, and active resistance to the forces of colonialism that perpetuate the 
subjugation and/or exploitation of our minds, bodies, and lands, and [that] is engaged for the 
ultimate purpose of overturning the colonial structure and realizing Indigenous liberation.” This 
process begins by questioning the legitimacy of colonialism. Unfortunately, decolonization of 
the mind is much easier said than done. For one, the recovery of indigenous languages is an 
integral part of this process and if no actions are taken to revive indigenous languages, many of 
them risk extinction, and the subsequent loss of their philosophies, traditions, and cultures 
(Wilson and Yellow Bird, 2010). This, however, requires a much more far reaching approach 
than a personal decision and isolated reflection.  
Ghandi’s political decolonization theory, Hind Swaraj, echoes much of the theory 
discussed above. His colonial critique highlights two steps: demystification and reversal. 
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Demystification, similar to decolonization of the mind, is the process of understanding that 
Western civilization is only superior according to the criteria that it set itself. In a colonial state, 
it is difficult to realize that technology, infrastructure, government, education, medicine, and 
judicial systems of the West are not the only criteria for civilization, that there are other methods 
and practices of achieving self-rule, health, and justice. Therefore, for decolonization to occur, 
the validity of the colonial system must be challenged. However, Gandhi asserts that 
demystification alone is not sufficient. The next step towards decolonization is reversal, the 
recovery of precolonial ideas and practices. This step demands the revalorization of languages, 
cultures, customs, traditions, ideas, and practices that the colonizers deemed as inferior (Kohn 
and McBride, 2011).  
Decolonization of the education system 
Since education has the capacity to participate in both of these steps, a common approach 
to decolonization is the reformation of the education system. In his text, Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed, Paulo Friere describes an education system rooted in praxis, “reflection and action 
upon the world in order to transform it,” as the means to transform subjugated human beings into 
liberated human beings. He distinguishes between the “banking” education model that 
dehumanizes students and teachers and promotes oppression and exclusion and the “authentic” 
education model, where there is a mutual, humanizing relationship between students and 
teachers, where education is a means of conscientization, a critical awareness of social reality 
achieved through action and reflection, and where the classroom can be a space for dialogue that 
liberates the colonized (Friere, 1970). This classroom can encourage the decolonization of the 
mind and demystification. Walter Mignolo suggests that love is the solution to the violent, 
controlling, and colonial nature of Friere’s “banking” system. He coins this solution, 
“bilanguaging love” and describes it as the, “...final utopic horizon for the liberation of human 
beings involved in structures of domination and subordination beyond their control” (Mignolo, 
2000).  
In addition to the importance of praxis and the practice of solidarity in the education 
system described by Freire and Mignolo, the content introduced in the classroom can also play a 
key role in decolonization. In the context of Botswana, Pandey and Moorad (2003) discuss the 
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importance of creating an innovative curriculum to “accommodate, appropriate, invite, and 
tolerate the old, the new, the outlandish, and so on to forge a new education,” and decolonize. 
Their study explains that critical models of curriculum in postcolonial Africa emerged after the 
irrelevance of Western models of curriculum was realized. Additionally, upon understanding that 
critical pedagogy is a relevant part of the process of the decolonization of the education system, 
they began to question: “What can Africa contribute to critical pedagogy in search of an ethical 
dimension for its application in African classrooms?” Their pedagogy reflects Africa’s vision to 
replace rather than heal their colonized and oppressed status. Therefore, the curriculum reflects 
the best of African cultures as well as certain advances in science, technology, and political 
democracy, among other ideas, developed in the West. Another primary objective of the new 
curriculum is to address the lack of knowledge and infrastructure available for natives to speak 
and express themselves. In sum, they argue, “A critical pedagogy to raise this consciousness of 
individuals must be grounded in [‘humaneness, human oneness’]. This is the ethics of 
emancipatory education required to decolonize the new nations coming out of the throes of 
oppression” (Pandey and Moorad, 2003).  
Philosophy of liberation 
Additionally, in Latin America, in the early 1970s, the philosophy of liberation, a 
decolonial movement, emerged in response to the region’s continued dependence on Europe and 
the United States, criticizing Western philosophy for favoring European interests and identities 
and ignoring its role in violence, exclusion, and domination. While the primary contributors to 
this philosophy, Arturo Andrés Roig, Horacio Cerutti Guldberg, Agusto Salazar Bondy, 
Leopoldo Zea, and Enrique Dussel, were inspired by different philosophers and described 
different means of achieving liberation, there are some common characteristics. Firstly, these 
scholars tend to agree that liberation begins with the oppressed. The marginalization of Latin 
America in the larger global context provides them with a unique perspective or “insight,” the 
ability to recognize the violence and exclusion custom to modernity (Kohn and McBride, 2011). 
Secondly, this philosophy calls for emancipation and calls on “national-popular movements” to 
bring about this radical social change. Thirdly, liberation philosophy always serves as a critique 
of modernity:  
	 8 
There are two dimensions of this critique of modernity. One is 
simply the idea that the values and practices brought to Latin 
America by the Spanish conquistadores cannot be understood 
simply as civilization, progress, and prosperity. The violent 
conquest and the hierarchical, exploitative system that is set up 
revealed the hypocrisy of the European values of equality and 
universalism, and rationality. European “civilization” cannot 
simply be dismissed because it is deeply and inevitably part of 
Latin American history, but the traditional creole and mestizo 
narrative that celebrates this history must be tempered by the 
recognition that the Spanish brought more barbarianism than 
civilization. The philosophical version of this point is that the 
value system of modernity was not simply the autonomous 
achievement of Europe but was instead a myth that emerged in 
response to Europe’s bloody encounter with the New World. 
(Kohn and McBride, 2011) 
Lastly, most liberation philosophy is influenced by dependency theory, the theory that 
resources flow from the “poor,” “underdeveloped” nations to the “rich,” “developed” nations, 
enriching the “developed” nations at the expense of the “underdeveloped” nations. Dependency 
theory was developed in the late 1950s by Raul Prebish and his colleagues. In the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America, they concluded that economic growth in the richer, 
developed countries often produced serious economic problems in poorer, lesser developed 
countries. This theory contradicted the neoclassical theory, which assumed that economic growth 
was beneficial to all. However, ever since colonialism, poor countries have exported primary 
goods to rich countries, where these goods were used to manufacture products that were then 
sold back to the poorer countries at a higher cost. Thus the poor countries never earned enough 
from their exports to pay for their imports. While Prebish’s initial solution to the problem was 
flawed, Marxist theorists have since concluded that the solution lies in dismantling the colonial, 
capitalist system itself (Ferraro, 2008). In sum, the philosophy of liberation demands a shift, led 
by the colonized, from the systems, institutions, and discourses of the colonizers to those of the 
colonized.  
Decolonization policy 
Despite the widespread need for decolonization, few countries have included these goals 
in their national agendas and policies. For most countries, decolonization policy did not go much 
farther than independence and the end of formal colonial rule. However, for some countries, 
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there was an extra step, the implementation of policies opposed to the domination of 
international corporations and in favor of the nationalization of industries. These economic 
movements for self-sufficiency and domestic economic growth, grounded in dependence theory, 
also served as a mechanism to cut ties with former colonial hegemons.  
In Burkina Faso, upon taking office in 1983, Thomas Sankara imposed a period of self-
adjustment that allowed the country to reach food self-sufficiency within four years. During this 
period, he also increased the production of cotton and promoted the clothing industry, so that all 
clothes could be made in Burkina Faso (Savadogo and Wetta, 1992). Sankara’s policies not only 
improved the domestic economy but they also lessened the country’s dependence on its colonial 
hegemon. Likewise, in Latin America, many countries have nationalized its major industries at 
one time or another. The most well-known example is Cuba. In 1960, in an attempt to distance 
itself from the United States, the regional hegemon, Castro nationalized all foreign-owned 
property, United States-owned property in particular, and in 1961, he also nationalized all 
property owned by religious organizations. Williams (1975) concludes that such radical reforms 
are most common in countries with similar economic and political structures, or with like 
problems, often newly independent countries. Even in Europe, small states have nationalized 
industries to diminish external economic dependence and regain control of the domestic 
economy (Katzenstein, 1985). By breaking economic ties with the hegemon and lessening 
dependence on the hegemon, states are free to create a new, decolonized society.  
Decolonization policy and indigenous peoples 
Even though these economic actions may be part of the solution, they are not the whole 
solution because they fail to address the need for the self-determination of the oppressed, 
marginalized, and excluded indigenous peoples. Further action and additional policies are needed 
to decolonize and address the exclusion of indigenous peoples. Canada, for example, has made 
some progress towards decolonization and the subsequent social inclusion of indigenous peoples. 
Specifically, Canadian universities have been working towards an accessible postsecondary 
education system for Aboriginal peoples since the 1970s. However, this increased accessibility 
has not been complemented by a change in university curricula. Most postsecondary curricula 
assume that “Eurocentric knowledge represents the neutral and necessary story for ‘all’ of us.” 
This assumption ignores and devalues Aboriginal knowledge and uses education as a method of 
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assimilating Aboriginal peoples rather than liberating them. This realization has prompted the 
University of Saskatchewan to explore decolonizing methodologies that will work to “restore 
Indigenous ecologies, consciousnesses, and languages after Eurocentric colonization and the 
destruction it authorized from its viral sources, and to understand how this history continues to 
imprison the thought and constrain the conduct of colonizer and colonized alike” (Battiste et al., 
2002). 
However, decolonization policy is not always limited to economic and education policy. 
In Latin America, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia are the few countries that have created a 
national agenda aimed at decolonizing the country. Each country has rewritten its constitution to 
reflect the multiculturalism and legal pluralism, “a plurality of continually evolving and 
interconnected processes enmeshed in wider power relations” of the country (Sieder, 2002). The 
1991 Constitution of Colombia declares the equality of cultures and guarantees its constituents 
the right to cultural diversity. The 2008 Constitution of Ecuador, however, takes it one step 
further and explicitly promotes the rights of indigenous peoples, and the 2009 Constitution of 
Bolivia takes it even another step further to include plural educational rights (Gargarella, 2014; 
Hayes, 2017).  
Social inclusion 
 The discussion of decolonization theory and policy presented above highlights the 
importance of addressing the exclusion and oppression of marginalized groups. It demands that 
the voices of the subaltern are heard and that their practices and ideas are recovered and 
revalued. Therefore, the process of decolonization should lead to greater social inclusion of 
indigenous peoples. The World Bank (2013) defines social inclusion as “the process of 
improving the terms on which individuals and groups take part in society—improving the ability, 
opportunity, and dignity of those disadvantaged on the basis of their identity.” Oftentimes, 
individuals make the mistake of only looking at the poverty of indigenous peoples. While 
poverty is certainly an important criterion, it is not the only measure of well-being nor is it the 
only indicator of social inclusion. Fortunately, in recent years, the World Bank has been a major 
advocate for social inclusion, dividing the concept into three domains: markets, services, and 
spaces (see Table 1). The World Bank recognizes that policies and programs have the potential 
to address more than one domain. Exclusion in one domain can cause or reinforce exclusion in 
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another domain. Therefore, social inclusion requires not one policy or program, but a sequence 
of interventions.    
Table 1: Policies and programs that address social inclusion (World Bank, 2013).  
DOMAIN OF INCLUSION INSTRUMENT/INTERVENTION 
Markets  
Land Titling of land 
Establishment of gender parity in inheritance laws 
Redistribution through land reforms 
Dissemination of information about land rights to 
excluded groups 
Accommodation of communal land patterns 
Housing Housing projects for slum dwellers, the poorest, people 
with disabilities, and migrants 
Labor Affirmative action/quotas 
Training on employability skills 
Short-term wage subsidies to firms 
Enforcement of anti-discrimination laws 
Maternity, paternity, and child-care benefits 
Coaching and mentoring for youth from excluded groups 
Financial Preferential credit 
Mobile phone banking 
Services  
Health Conditional cash transfers 
Subsidized health insurance 
Integration of cultural norms and values of the excluded 
into service delivery 
Raising awareness on HIV/AIDS in infrastructure 
projects 
Transport vouchers 
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Education Affirmative action/quotas 
Tuition and other cost exemptions 
Multicultural curriculum 
Teacher training in inclusive education 
Bilingual/alternative teaching 
Accessible teaching methods and flexible curriculum 
Information/information and 
communications technology (ICT) 
Distance/online learning for the excluded 
Use of ICT to disseminate information on inputs and 
prices 
Mobile phone applications to monitor outcomes and 
perceptions 
Social protection Social pensions 
Disability pensions 
Water and sanitation Separate toilets for girls in schools 
Assurance of women’s access to irrigated land and water 
Infrastructure Women-only transport services 
Accessible transport, buildings, and curb cuts for people 
with disabilities 
Improvement of safety through street lighting, pedestrian 
walkways, and crossings 
Involvement of communities in maintenance of local 
infrastructure, disaster management, and environmental 
planning and conservation 
Spaces  
Physical Establishment of safety in public places 
Training on gender-based violence (and recourse to it), 
including separate training for men and women to reduce 
gender-based violence 
Reservation of spaces in markets 
Cultural Recognition of multiple languages, customs 
Social Institutionalization of different forms of family life, such 
as same-sex marriages 
	 13 
Information campaigns to change stereotypes 
Passage of anti-discrimination laws 
Raising awareness among excluded/stigmatized 
groups/individuals about their rights 
Advocacy by public figures on behalf of stigmatized 
groups/individuals 
Fostering of critical thinking by general public or 
stakeholders whose discriminatory behavior is 
particularly harmful, such as health care providers, 
police, the judiciary, journalists, and educators 
Promotion of interaction between excluded and non-
excluded groups 
Public celebrations of heroes of oppressed; building of 
memorials 
Official apologies 
Arts and culture 
Political  Affirmative action/quotas 
Counting in official statistics 
Institutional Separate entities of enforcement 
 
While the World Bank is a good starting point for addressing social inclusion, it is 
important to note that social inclusion is not synonymous with assimilation. Indigenous peoples 
should not have to abandon their own beliefs, customs, and traditions to gain access to the 
markets, services, and spaces available to the dominant group(s). Corntassel (2012) warns 
against this “illusion for inclusion.” Social inclusion within a colonial system often mobilizes an 
indigenous rights discourse to produce political and economic “solutions” rather than 
“sustainable, spiritual foundations,” and likely pushes “the energies of transnational Indigenous 
networks into the institutional fiefdoms of member countries” (Corntassel, 2012).  
Contribution to the literature 
In this sense, true social inclusion can only be achieved through decolonization. 
Therefore, this study will operationalize decolonization as a means of undoing the discriminatory 
and exclusionary legacies of colonialism, in turn, increasing social inclusion for indigenous 
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peoples. Even though studies have been conducted on the Morales administration and its 
policies, there are still gaps in the literature. This comprehensive study of the “decolonizing” 
policies of the Evo Morales administration seeks to fill one of those gaps, addressing the claim 
that this administration has not fully addressed the colonial state but instead promoted it 
(Johnson, 2002).  To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies that examine the effect(s) of 
the Evo Morales administration on the social inclusion of indigenous peoples in Bolivia.  
Therefore, the primary objective of this thesis is to analyze the efforts made by the Evo 
Morales administration to decolonize Bolivia and their effects. It is important to note that no 
other government has placed decolonization at the center of its national agenda to the same 
extent as Bolivia. Despite the fact that many countries are still suffering the consequences of 
their colonial history, outside of Bolivia, the discussion of decolonization is primarily limited to 
decolonization theory and the wars for independence. Globally, many indigenous communities 
are employing a discourse of decolonization to challenge oppression, exclusion, and 
marginalization. However, in the case of Bolivia, the government itself has applied this 
discourse. This has led me to wonder whether or not the indigenous peoples of Bolivia are 
actually better off under the Evo Morales administration and to formulate the following research 
question: How should one measure the influence of the Evo Morales administration’s 
“decolonizing” policies on the social inclusion of indigenous peoples? Unfortunately, I currently 
lack the resources to explicitly measure the impact of these policies on the social inclusion of 
indigenous peoples. Instead, this research aims to bring existing literature and data into 
conversation with one another and lay the groundwork for future impact evaluations.    
METHODOLOGY 
Methods  
In order to answer my research question, I will analyze la nacionalización de los 
hidrocarburos, la ley de reconducción comunitaria de la reforma agraria, el plan nacional de 
desarrollo, la ley de la educación, la ley de deslinde, la ley marco de autonomías, and TIPNIS. 
According to the Evo Morales administration, all of its domestic policies aim to contribute to the 
government’s overarching goal of decolonization. These are nearly all the major policies of the 
Evo Morales administration, with the exception of his coca policy, which I have omitted from 
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this study because it is a topic in and of itself. Additionally, the policies I have selected often 
specifically target the self-determination and social inclusion of indigenous peoples. Within the 
national development plan, I focus my analysis on the Bolivia Digna strategy and its Bono Juana 
Azurduy and Bono Juancito Pinto because, of the four strategies, this strategy most specifically 
targets social inclusion. In addition to the policies themselves, I will examine the existing 
literature on decolonization theory, studies and reports conducted by other scholars on some of 
these policies, the existing literature on social inclusion, and the relevant data available in 
Bolivia for measuring the social inclusion of indigenous peoples.  
Analysis 
My analysis is two-fold: evaluating decolonization policy and unpacking social inclusion. 
First, I will employ the decolonization theories discussed in my literature review to evaluate 
whether and how the Morales administration’s decolonization policies improve social inclusion 
for indigenous peoples in Bolivia. A decolonizing policy is one that works to undo the colonial 
legacies that continue to marginalize indigenous peoples, establishing indigenous self-
determination and autonomy and increasing social inclusion for indigenous peoples. While there 
are few studies, there are scholars that have studied some of the decolonization policies of the 
Evo Morales administration. Therefore, I will also incorporate the previous findings of Albó, 
Drange, Hilborn, Johnson, Marco-Navarro, McNeish, Molyneux and Thompson, and Shoaei into 
my own analysis of these policies. 
Second, when available, I will discuss the literature that examines the impacts of some of 
his administration’s policies and their contribution, or lack thereof, to the social inclusion of 
indigenous peoples, an expressed goal of the administration’s policies. Given the 
multidimensional nature of social inclusion, the measurement of the social inclusion of 
indigenous peoples is a considerably difficult task. It requires a thorough investigation of the 
services (social protection, information, electricity, transport, education, health, water), markets 
(land, housing, labor, credit), and spaces (political, physical, cultural, social) that are accessible 
for the indigenous peoples of Bolivia (World Bank, 2013). Unfortunately, much of this data is 
currently nonexistent or inaccessible. For starters, the Bolivian census does not separate the 
indigenous and nonindigenous populations but instead separates the rural and urban populations. 
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While many studies have used rural as a substitute for indigenous and urban as a substitute for 
nonindigenous, the “rapid urbanization” of indigenous peoples in recent years has outdated this 
technique (Gigler, 2009). As a result, my findings will rely primarily on qualitative forms of data 
to discuss what we should see, the data that does exist, and why and how this could be a result of 
decolonization policy.  
Limitations 
I was unable to conduct research in Bolivia on this specific question, given limited 
resources. However, I draw extensively from my experiences living and studying in Bolivia with 
the School for International Training in Spring 2017 and use the insights I gathered from 
conversations and observations to connect the relevant bodies of literature and existing data. 
Given the difficult nature of studying this topic, my findings are highly dependent on my 
approach, on how I have defined decolonization and social inclusion, and the information that is 
accessible to me. I expect to find that even though there are benefits to decolonization policy, not 
all policies are as decolonizing as the rhetoric of the current administration suggests and, while 
the social inclusion of indigenous peoples has improved, there is still significant progress to be 
made. In my discussion of these policies and concepts, I hope to bring to light the relevance and 
benefit of future study.  
THE MORALES ADMINISTRATION  
 In order to fully appreciate the Morales administration’s policies, more context is needed. 
Evo Morales of the MAS was first elected in 2005 with a historic 54 percent of the popular vote. 
The MAS is generally associated with the harder left, or the “pink tide,” like the governments of 
Venezuela and Cuba. During his first term as president, in addition to rewriting the constitution, 
Morales implemented several economic programs and social reforms. Morales was then 
reelected in 2009 with 64 percent of the popular vote (Webber, 2011). Later, in 2013, he asked 
the constitutional court to allow him to bypass the two-term limit. The court allowed it because 
he served his first term before the new Constitution of 2009. In 2016, Morales called for a 
referendum that would allow him to run for a fourth term. However, 51 percent of voters rejected 
the amendment. Determined to run again, Morales brought the case to the constitutional court, 
which concluded in November 2017 that the term limit discriminates against the president. 
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Supposedly, denying a person the right to be elected is a violation of human rights (Vivanco and 
Pappier, 2017). Thus, making Morales eligible for yet another term in office. In light of this, the 
following section aims to establish the events that brought about the first indigenous president of 
Bolivia and his administration’s stance on decolonization.  
The rise of Evo Morales and the MAS 
The frequent exploitation of indigenous peoples in Bolivia often provoked indigenous-led 
protests that paved the way for the election of the first indigenous president. Most significantly, 
the Water War of 2000 and the Gas War of 2003 forced former President Sánchez Losada to 
resign from the presidency. The Water War was sparked by the government’s decision to 
privatize Cochabamba’s public and communal water source and sell them to the U.S. 
multinational corporation, Bechtel. This decision led to an unaffordable increase in the price of 
water and brought about a massive, three-month long mobilization, largely organized by the 
indigenous Quechua population, that eventually prompted the government to abandon its plan to 
privatize the water source. A few years later, the Sánchez Losada government made a second 
attempt at privatization, trying to open the gas industry to foreign participation. The 
government’s intentions to sell Bolivian gas to transatlantic markets and build a pipeline through 
the Andes to Chile prompted the Gas War. Again, a massive protest ensued, primarily led by the 
indigenous population. The government’s response to the protests was often violent and included 
the massacre of indigenous peoples in Warisata, the center of the Aymara altiplano and the 
killing of many unarmed protesters, blocking the road from El Alto to La Paz. The subsequent 
fall of Sánchez Losada in 2003 was followed by the brief presidencies of Carlos Mesa and 
Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé. In hopes of putting an end to massive indigenous protests, on 
December 18, 2005, Evo Morales was elected president and the MAS won over 12 of the 27 
senate seats and 72 of the 130 deputy positions (Klein, 2011). Upon inheriting an extremely 
unequal society, the Evo Morales administration set out to carry out a radical transformation.  
La nueva constitución del estado plurinacional de Bolivia 
 In 2009, the Bolivian Constitution was rewritten to reflect the multiethnic character of the 
country. Before the election of Evo Morales, there had been long and large, nationwide protests 
pressing for a new constitution to re-found Bolivia. The most prominent voice was the Unity 
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Pact, a coalition of indigenous organizations that demanded that the constitution decolonize and 
“radically alter the structure and system of the state towards a system called ‘plurinationalism’” 
(Hilborn, 2014). When finally rewritten, the constitution was intended to reflect the 
interculturality of the country and represent the ethics of indigenous communities. Additionally, 
the state pledged to protect pachamama (Mother Earth), to protect the environment. It also 
guaranteed to protect traditional cultures, to respect and promote traditional cosmology, 
medicine, rituals, symbols, and dress, to allow indigenous communities to operate according to 
their own political, judicial, and economic systems, and to implement a plurilingual education 
system (Klein, 2011). However, even though the constitution has been widely praised for its 
“recognition of the precolonial existence of the indígena, originario, campesino (IOC) nations 
and peoples, the official re-designation of the state as ‘plurinational’ and openings towards 
juridical pluralism,” altered much of the Unity Pact’s vision for the Constitution. Even though it 
did promote the concept of indigenous autonomy, certain measures of central state control were 
reintroduced into the Constitution and the ability to recover and reconstruct precolonial 
territories was restricted (Hilborn, 2014). 
El viceministerio de descolonización  
 In the same year, Evo Morales founded the Vice-Ministry of Decolonization (VMD), 
which operates as a branch within the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. In essence, the purpose 
of the VMD is to promote decolonization in Bolivia. In addition to organizing traditional 
ceremonies and events, the VMD also releases publications on the topic of decolonization and 
depatriarchalization, speaks on the threat of capitalism and United States imperialism, carries out 
projects intended to support decolonization, and works with other ministries to systematically 
promote decolonization. The VMD most closely represents the administrations perspective on 
decolonization, explaining it as, “a process of recuperating indigenous values and culture while 
removing negative aspects of colonial culture,” an alternative to modernity. However, many of 
the VMD’s projects, celebrations, and traditions are “state orchestrations of indigenous culture” 
that do not take into account the pre-existing indigenous practices. Despite the plurinational 
identity of Bolivia, a nation of 37 recognized indigenous cultures, the VMD tends to homogenize 
indigenous culture, advocating for a single Bolivian society and marking indigenous autonomy 
as a threat to central authority. Overall, the VMD appears to advocate for “the consolidation of a 
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strong and centralized ‘indigenous state’ founded on an abstract and imagined sense of 
indigenous culture” (Hilborn, 2014).  
FINDINGS 
Morales and the MAS came to power after the Water War and Gas War, a period of 
intense exclusion and exploitation of the indigenous population. Therefore, the same 
psychopathology that Fanon describes in Black Skin, White Masks can be applied to the 
indigenous peoples of Bolivia, who were regularly associated with backwardness and 
barbarianism and continuously silenced and repressed. As a result, the decolonization of the 
Bolivian state calls for the creation of a new people, free from submission and inferiority. It also 
calls for the inclusion of indigenous voices. In many ways, Morales, the first indigenous 
president of Bolivia, is an example of the subaltern speaking. As described above, Bolivia’s new 
constitution and new VMD most closely represent the Morales administration’s goals with 
regards to decolonization. While the MAS does advocate for indigenous rights, the social 
inclusion of indigenous peoples, and a new, decolonized, inclusive society, not all parts of the 
Constitution nor all facets of the VMD reflect this mission. The following discussion of many of 
the Morales administration’s domestic policies and their effects on the social inclusion of 
indigenous peoples also reflects this pattern of inconsistency.  
La nacionalización de los hidrocarburos  
On May 1, 2006, shortly after his historic election, Morales nationalized the hydrocarbon 
industry, making Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (Bolivian Fiscal Petroliferous 
Deposits, YPFB) the official Bolivian state owned oil company, and the only company that could 
control claims. This reform declared the oil reserves the property of Bolivia and, therefore, 
excluded transnational companies from their previously greater shares of profits. This reform 
was also followed by the nationalization of other industries. As a result, the state’s profits from 
the mining and hydrocarbon industries grew from $250 million in 2006 to over $2 billion in 2008 
(Shoaei, 2012). This policy reflects the VMD’s emphasis on the threat of global capitalism and 
United States imperialism to decolonization efforts. In nationalizing its industries, the Bolivian 
government attempted to separate itself from the regional hegemon. This practice, rooted in 
dependency theory, aimed to liberate Bolivia economically. However, while an important step 
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towards ending neoliberalism and foreign domination, the nationalization of industries did not 
directly address the problem of social exclusion of indigenous peoples in Bolivia. Nevertheless, 
the profits are said to have helped finance social programs that would diminish social exclusion 
(see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Oil revenue in Bolivia (in millions of US dollars) (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 
2016).   
La ley de reconducción comunitaria de la reforma agraria 
Land reform was one of the more popular consequences of the nationalization of 
industries in Bolivia. During the month of September, 2016, in an attempt to reconcile centuries 
of discrimination and exclusion of indigenous peoples, Morales implemented a land reform act to 
redistribute land to the “poor” and indigenous peoples. Over 200,000 square kilometers of land 
were redistributed to the poor. While this reform was first implemented in 2006, it was later 
incorporated into the new constitution of 2009. During this three-year span, approximately 23 
million hectares of land were redistributed (Shoaei, 2012). In terms of social inclusion, access to 
land is a notable achievement, particularly in many indigenous communities, where the land is 
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often cultivated and farmed and serves as a source of livelihood. It is expected to create 
opportunity and enhance dignity for indigenous peoples. Therefore, this land reform should 
result in a measurable improvement in the well-being of indigenous peoples.  
The World Bank (2013) recognizes land reform as an appropriate intervention for 
addressing social inclusion, one that often results in a decline in exclusion and inequality. 
However, it also acknowledges that land reform is not a cure-all solution for exclusion and 
inequality; additional interventions are likely necessary. For example, in Brazil, while land 
reforms increased access to land for the poor, “outside settlers,” these new settlers faced 
opposition from the land’s former inhabitants, who challenged the legitimacy and economic 
stability of their use of the land (Lindemann, 2010). Additionally, in West Bengal, only 
households that also invested in inputs like seeds and technology experienced observable gains 
from the land reforms (Deininger et al., 2009).  
Regardless, in order to evaluate progress towards social inclusion, it is also necessary to 
question whether or not land reform is decolonizing. Since their lands were illegitimately seized 
during colonization, one could argue that decolonization demands that all land be placed under 
the control of indigenous peoples. Today, redistributing all Bolivian land does not appear 
realistic. Instead, indigenous peoples likely need to settle for recognition. Therefore, land reform, 
though insufficient alone, is a positive step towards both decolonizing the state and increasing 
social inclusion for indigenous peoples.  
El plan nacional de desarrollo 
Issued six months into his presidency, el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo: Bolivia Digna, 
Soberana, Productiva y Democrática para la construcción del Vivir Bien is the first official 
social development strategy of the Evo Morales administration. Bolivia has a long history of 
both colonialism and neoliberalism and a more recent history of external colonialism, 
domination by powerful countries and international and transnational corporations, that has 
promoted poverty, inequality, exclusion, and dependency. This plan aimed to begin the process 
of dismantling colonialism and neoliberalism and creating a new society, a plurinational, 
communal state. As its name suggests, the plan nacional de desarrollo consisted of four 
strategies: the “socio-communitarian” strategy (Bolivia Digna), the sovereign international 
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relations strategy (Bolivia Soberana), the economic strategy (Bolivia Productiva), which 
includes the nacionalización de los hidrocarburos and the ley de reconducción comunitaria de la 
reforma agraria, and the “social power” strategy (Bolivia Democrática). Each strategy shared a 
common goal of incorporating Bolivia’s cultural identity, the knowledge of their ancestors, and 
technological advancement to create a new society and eradicate poverty and social exclusion 
(Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2006; Johnson, 2009).  
At first glance, the national development plan seems to be making important strides 
towards decolonization. The concept of vivir bien, or living well, provides a foundation for the 
plan. Vivir bien, “a philosophy that values life, seeks balance with oneself, and with others, seeks 
for both individual and collective living well, promoting the respect and harmonious coexistence 
between human beings and nature,” is a traditional indigenous philosophy that the administration 
has defined as an alternative to capitalism and modernity (Plan de desarrollo económico y social, 
2016). The administration’s decision to work towards a new paradigm of balance, one that 
blends the most positive aspects of traditional and modern society, is supported by most political 
decolonization theory. Kohn and McBride (2011) conclude that: 
In order to legitimize a break with the past and a vision of the 
future, founders must act in the name of a people that does not yet 
exist. They must turn either to the past or to the future in order to 
perform a kind of alchemy, that of transforming people into a 
people. Both strategies entail certain dangers. Relying on an 
imagined community from the precolonial past naturalizes the 
people and may end up justifying parochialism and exclusion. 
Founding a polity for the new man may justify the pursuit of 
certain collective goods at the expense of original freedom.  
In working towards a new paradigm, the Bolivian government is working “in the name of a 
people that does not yet exist.” Kohn and McBride argue that the nation must either return to the 
past or work towards the future for transformation. As Bolivia is working to return to its 
precolonial, indigenous roots without abandoning the advances of modern technology, the 
country seems to be blending the past with the future. Since colonial legacies manifest in much 
of modern society, this approach is also wrought with “certain dangers.” 
With this in mind, the following analysis of the development plan will focus on the 
Bolivia Digna strategy, the strategy that most closely sought to, “[eradicate] poverty, all forms of 
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exclusion, marginalization, and social, political, cultural, and economic exploitation; in addition 
to generating a pattern of distributing income, wealth, and opportunities” (Estado Plurinacional 
de Bolivia, 2006, my translation). Bolivia Digna included conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programs like the Bono Juancito Pinto and the Bono Juana Azurduy, intended to help the country 
create a new, socially inclusive society. From 2006 to 2014, MAS argues that there has been an 
observed reduction in infant and maternal mortality rates and school dropouts because of the 
Bono Juana Azurduy and Bono Juancito Pinto, respectively.  
While this sounds effective, upon closer examination, under the lens of decolonization, 
the impact of the Bono Juana Azurduy becomes more complicated. In 2009, the Evo Morales 
administration implemented this bono, giving women a total of approximately $261 USD if they 
attend prenatal checkups during pregnancy, give birth in a state medical facility, and bring their 
child to medical checkups until age two (Johnson, 2009). The bono is believed to have benefited 
765,000 children and 523,000 pregnant women from 2009 to 2014 (Estado Plurinacional de 
Bolivia, 2016). It also established “waiting houses” that provide women living in faraway 
communities with a place to stay close to the hospital before they give birth. However, these are 
often unpopular because they require women to leave their home, their family, and their 
responsibilities. Even progressive healthcare and development workers have criticized the bono, 
labeling it as a “step backward towards mercantilism and dependency from long-standing efforts 
by social movements and progressive NGOs to raise awareness and empower women with 
regard to health knowledge and health-seeking behavior” (Johnson, 2009). In fact, many of the 
conditions violate women’s sexual and reproductive rights. The bono attempts to inflict birth 
spacing, requiring that beneficiaries wait two years before claiming a second transfer. If they 
become pregnant during that two-year period, they are not eligible for the bono. Additionally, if 
a woman miscarries or aborts, she cannot apply for a transfer for an additional three years. The 
government assures that these requirements are in the best interest of a women’s health. 
However, most women agree that they are being unjustly penalized. These restrictions are likely 
a reflection of the fact that women’s agencies were left out of the decision making process 
(Molyneux and Thompson, 2011).   
The bono’s failure to accommodate traditional indigenous medicinal practices and its 
ability to incentivize the abandonment of these practices is even more problematic for 
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decolonization. While the increased accessibility of western medicine in indigenous communities 
might lead to a decrease in the infant mortality rate, the financial relief of the bono also pressures 
the colonized to abandon their customary practices and adopt those of their colonizers. In many 
indigenous communities, it is tradition for the mother to give birth in her home. Indigenous 
women, skeptical of western medicine, place their trust in midwives and traditional herbal 
medicines. With that said, the bono does permit certain traditional practices. Women are allowed 
to use traditional herbal medicines, give birth in the standing position, and have a close relative 
present. However, these concessions and accommodations are not sufficient. Many indigenous 
women still prefer to give birth at home with the assistance of a midwife and, although the bono 
does not explicitly require hospital births, participants can be “temporarily suspended” from the 
program if they give birth at home (Molyneux and Thompson, 2011). In sum, if the Morales 
administration were truly committed to the recovery of indigenous traditions, it would not 
implement a policy that incentivized the abandonment of their traditions.  
While the Evo Morales administration affirms that the bono has led to greater social 
inclusion, these issues suggest that their true impact is not clear and requires more explicit 
measurement. Additionally, the bono demands greater questioning: can the Bolivian government 
simultaneously increase access to western medicine and promote traditional medicinal practices? 
In effect, how can the Morales administration effectively blend traditional and modern society to 
create a new, decolonized society? Also, and perhaps most importantly, what do the indigenous 
beneficiaries themselves think of the bono? 
As it turns out, previous studies focused on the implementation of this bono have actually 
uncovered that the majority of the criticism comes from the recipients themselves. Many 
indigenous women have not been treated with respect because of their identity and socio-
economic status, citing language barriers as a source of discrimination. Additionally, the 
indigenous beneficiaries have been labeled as lazy and have been accused of having children for 
the sole purpose of receiving the cash transfer. Women have even reported that their homes and 
clothes have been inspected. If it appears that their standard of living has increased, they have 
been threatened with loss of the bono (Molyneux and Thompson, 2011). While an increase in 
access to health services may be an important step towards social inclusion, this step is likely 
discounted due to the increase in discrimination.  
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El Bono Juancito Pinto is another conditional cash transfer that was implemented in 2006 
with the funds from the hydrocarbon industry. The bono distributes $28 USD a year for children 
in primary school with the intent of keeping more children in school. While this bono does not 
make any specific efforts to decolonize, it is intended to increase social inclusion by increasing 
access to education for indigenous peoples. In fact, the World Bank (2013) considers conditional 
cash transfers an intervention capable of addressing many domains of social inclusion. 
Additionally, the Bolivian government cites that between 2006 and 2014, the number of children 
and adolescents that benefited from the bono increased from 1,084,967 to 2,132,393 (Estado 
Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2016). 
 
Figure 2: School dropout rates in Bolivia, 1997 – 2014 (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2016).  
While the Morales administration affirms that the bono has had a large, positive impact, 
especially with regards to the dropout rate (see Figure 2), different studies have drawn varying 
conclusions. Marco-Navarro (2012) found evidence that the policy reduced school dropouts and 
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increased school attendance. Additionally, he concluded that the graduation rate has seen stark 
increases with little difference in regard to gender and urban vs. rural populations. Recently, 
García and Saavedra (2017) conducted a meta-analysis of conditional cash transfers in the 
developing world, which concluded that there was no statistically significant increase in school 
enrollment. Regardless of the impact of the bono, the quality of public education is still a major 
issue. Even if the bono increases access to education, it does not address the quality of the 
education. The more pressing question is whether or not the education system itself is 
decolonizing and inclusive.  
La ley de la educación 
Although its effectiveness is not cut and dry, the education law seeks to tackle what the 
Bono Juancito Pinto cannot address, the quality of education in Bolivia. In fact, the law was 
intended to establish an “originary indigenous education,” a transition towards “socio-cultural, 
territorial, political and ideological self-determination” (Howard, 2009). It attempts to replace the 
colonizing, out-of-touch-with-reality, and individualistic education system with a decolonizing, 
depatriarchalizing, productive, and “socio-comunitarian” one. It also emphasizes interculturality, 
the “interrelation” and interaction of the knowledge, expertise, and technology of each culture 
with other cultures. Interculturality is dependent on the notion that no culture is superior to 
another culture. It emphasizes the recuperation, strengthening, and development of indigenous 
cultures and, in turn, promotes equality, solidarity, complementarity, reciprocity, and justice 
(Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2010).  
 Additionally, this policy incorporates decolonization’s call for the recovery of indigenous 
languages. The ley de la educación places the use and promotion of indigenous languages at the 
forefront of the policy, creating the Instituto Plurinacional de Estudio de Lenguas y Culturas 
(Plurinational Institute of Languages and Cultures). According to the law, in monolingual 
communities, where the indigenous language is the predominant language, the primary language 
in the classroom should be the indigenous language and the secondary language should be 
Spanish. On the other hand, in monolingual communities, where the predominant language is 
Spanish, the primary language in the classroom should be Spanish and the secondary language 
should be the indigenous language of the region. In trilingual or plurilingual communities, the 
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indigenous language used in the classroom will be determined by specific territoriality criteria. 
Additionally, linguistic policies will be implemented to recuperate endangered languages (Estado 
Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2010). 
The implementation of a regionalized curriculum further addresses the recovery of 
indigenous traditions and histories custom to decolonization. Previously, the Bolivian education 
system prepared its children to live in a distant, imagined world, far from the reality and context 
of the indigenous communities. This system inadvertently or not, encouraged its students to 
forget their own traditions and customs. Therefore, in an effort to address the gap between the 
education system and indigenous reality, the new education law mandates study plans, 
methodologies, and processes that will promote the cultural identity of the indigenous 
communities. Further, it is the responsibility of the Ministry of Education to design, approve, and 
implement a curriculum, taking into account the perspectives of education experts and 
indigenous voices, that is based in the plurinationality of Bolivia and preserves its “harmony and 
complementarity.” However, the law also permits the indigenous communities and nations to 
develop their own community education processes in agreement with the productive activities of 
the community, which, in essence, promotes indigenous self-determination (Estado Plurinacional 
de Bolivia, 2010).  
Furthermore, the ley de la educación is not limited to primary and secondary education, 
but also addresses the decolonization of the country’s universities. The establishment of three 
indigenous universities, one Aymara, one Quechua, and one Guaraní, in 2009, is particularly 
significant. The law states that these undergraduate and graduate academic institutions are 
centers for professional development, research, and innovation. From an “academic, scientific, 
communitarian, and productive space,” these universities also aim to recover, strengthen, and 
foster indigenous languages and knowledge (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2010, my 
translation). Based on a visit to the Universidad Indígena Boliviana Aymara “Tupac Katari,” it is 
evident that their curriculum is rooted in Aymaran values and designed not as a means of escape 
from the students’ impoverished, excluded communities but as a method of promoting 
productive and meaningful returns to their indigenous communities.  
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In many ways, the ley de la educación is a model for decolonization policy. Its promotion 
of indigenous cultures, beliefs, traditions, values, and languages is strongly supported by 
decolonization theory. However, what still requires investigation, is the implementation of the 
policy. Unfortunately, this is not a simple task. It would require a thorough examination of the 
curriculum and extensive classroom observation. Current research, while limited, suggests that 
the policy has yet to be implemented in all parts of the education system and many teachers have 
not yet been trained on the new policies and how they should be implemented. However, 
evaluations suggest that when implemented, the new policy has had a positive impact on 
interculturality: indigenous students have improved their knowledge of their mother tongues and 
cultures and have increased their self-esteems (Drange, 2012). If successful, the ley de la 
educación could be the most influential decolonization policy of the administration. Given the 
power of education, if implemented correctly, a decolonial education is likely the most effective 
tool to decolonize the mind. Hopefully, it would lead the next generation of thinkers to 
implement more progressive and inclusive policies.  
La ley de deslinde y la ley marco de autonomías 
Despite the education law’s ability to promote indigeneity, the Morales administration 
has also implemented policies that limit the rights of indigenous peoples, taking several steps 
backwards with regards to achieving social inclusion. For one, the ley de deslinde is generally 
considered unconstitutional because it limits the practice of indigenous justice. While Article 2 
of the constitution supposedly granted IOC communities the right to their own forms of 
government and justice, this right was later limited to territories that had acquired Autonomía 
Indígena Origenario Campesino (Indigenous Originary Peasant Autonomy, AIOC) status. At the 
time, no communities had been granted this status and this new piece of legislation, rightfully, 
caused anger among many indigenous communities (Hilborn, 2014). In 2010, in their address to 
the senate, indigenous deputies stated, “To fail to acknowledge our capacity to be self-governed 
and to exercise our own political and legal systems (Art. 30-14, CPE) is to assume that our 
peoples lack the seriousness of ordinary justice, that we would not have sufficient maturity for it, 
as if we were minors. This would imply discrimination and even a form of racism” (Albó, 2012, 
my translation). By limiting indigenous autonomy, the Morales administration is upholding 
colonial practices, and further excluding indigenous communities.   
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Likewise, the ley marco de autonomías, the framework for indigenous autonomy and the 
establishment of AIOC territories, has received plenty of criticism for contradicting the 
constitution and returning to colonial practices. First, AIOC status is limited to communities that 
are already recognized as a municipality or a Territorio Indígena Originario Campesino 
(Indigenous, Originary, Peasant Territory, TIOC) by the state. Second, the application process 
consists of “onerous conditions and bureaucratic requirements.” This long and slow process 
suggests that the MAS, in reality, is not committed to increasing the number of indigenous 
autonomies. Third, the state is heavily involved in the definition of the organizational structure of 
indigenous autonomies, making it difficult for the AIOCs to stray from the municipal structure 
and nearly defeating the purpose of indigenous autonomy (Hilborn, 2014). In restricting the self-
determination and autonomy of indigenous communities, these policies blatantly contradict the 
administration’s efforts to decolonize and serve to further oppress indigenous peoples.  
TIPNIS 
Regardless, these “decolonizing” policies, flawed or not, will never be enough to achieve 
decolonization and social inclusion if the government continues to silence and exploit indigenous 
peoples. The recent TIPNIS controversy, in particular, highlights the break between the current 
administration’s rhetoric and practice. While TIPNIS also exemplifies the contradictions within 
its environmental discourse, this study will focus on the contradictions within its indigenous 
discourse. In 2011, the Bolivian government announced that it would be constructing a highway 
through the Isoboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS), home to many 
indigenous communities. This announcement led thousands of indigenous community members 
to mobilize, and march in protest for almost two months to the nation’s capital, La Paz. 
Unfortunately, in September of 2011, indigenous protestors were brutally raided by the police 
outside of Yucumo. This incident at Chaparina was the first significant crisis of public 
confidence in the Evo Morales administration. In attempting to repress and silence the demands 
of the indigenous peoples, the Bolivian government contradicted its efforts to decolonize the 
state, hear indigenous voices, and promote indigenous rights (McNeish, 2013). The outcry that 
followed the massacre at Chaparina forced the government to cancel its plans to build a road and, 
instead granted TIPNIS a new, protected status, preventing invasive building projects. However, 
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six years later, on August 13, 2017, President Evo Morales revoked the park’s protected status, 
allowing for the highway to be constructed after all.  
While this incident may be the most glaring contradiction of the Morales administration, 
it is not the only one. Many of the Morales administration’s other policies are also wrought with 
contradictions, in particular, the Bono Juana Azurduy, the ley de deslinde, and the ley de marco 
autonomías. In an effort to decrease the infant and maternal mortality rates, the Bono Juana 
Azurduy violates women’s sexual and reproductive rights, fails to properly accommodate 
traditional indigenous medicinal practices, and increases discrimination. This bono’s ability to 
incentivize the abandonment of traditional indigenous medicinal practices especially highlights 
the important difference between inclusion and assimilation. Additionally, despite the 
administration’s pro-indigenous rights discourse, the ley de deslinde and the ley de marco 
autonomías clearly limit indigenous justice and autonomy. 
The other policies examined have fewer contradictions, but future study is still required 
to understand their effectiveness. Despite the fact that the nacionalización de los hidrocarburos 
and the ley de reconducción comunitaria de la reforma agraria do not appear as controversial, 
these reforms alone are not enough to decolonize the state nor end the social exclusion of 
indigenous peoples. The exclusion of indigenous peoples is much more systematic and requires 
an approach that tackles more than just access to land. Even though the decolonization of the 
education system has the potential to significantly improve the social inclusion of indigenous 
peoples, more study is required to truly understand the impact of the Bono Juancito Pinto and the 
ley de la educación. While the Bono Juancito Pinto does not have any glaring issues, its 
effectiveness is questionable. Of all the policies, the ley de la educación appears to be making 
the most progress towards decolonization and social inclusion, but little is actually known about 
its implementation.  
CONCLUSION 
Even though these contradictions may prevent Bolivia from fulfilling its process of 
decolonization, there are still lessons to be learned from the Morales administration’s 
decolonization policies. Mainly, this study highlights the importance of including all voices in 
policy-making decisions. While Morales may identify as indigenous himself, he cannot speak for 
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all indigenous peoples if he does not take the time to listen to them. For example, the 
administration did not take the time to understand the position of indigenous women before 
implementing the Bono Juana Azurduy. Had the administration given these women a platform, 
the bono could have yielded a much more favorable solution. Additionally, as seen in the recent 
TIPNIS controversy, the Morales administration’s policies will never be enough to achieve 
decolonization and social inclusion if the government continues to exploit and silence indigenous 
peoples. 
The current effects of Morales administration’s policies on the social inclusion of 
indigenous peoples may be disappointing, but that should not signal the abandonment of 
decolonization policy as a viable means of achieving decolonization and social inclusion. 
Scholars suggest that decolonization policy has the potential to evoke radical change. 
Unfortunately, in the case of Bolivia, not all policies are as decolonizing as the rhetoric of the 
current administration suggests. Therefore, even though some findings seem to suggest that the 
social inclusion of indigenous peoples in Bolivia has improved, there is still progress to be made, 
and it cannot happen without increased, authentic decolonization efforts.  
Since many of their policies are not fully decolonizing, the Evo Morales administration’s 
policies may not be proof of the intrinsic relationship between decolonization policy and social 
inclusion. Regardless, these conclusions are dependent on future research. This study begs the 
following questions: Can a state decolonize itself? If it cannot, who can? Is the problem state 
involvement or the inconsistencies and controversies of this state? Although it may currently 
appear that the problem is the inconsistencies and controversies of the Morales administration, 
future research is needed to confirm this. If decolonization policy is not a viable method of 
decolonizing, is Fanon right? Does the creation of a new, decolonial society require violence? 
The Morales administration might not be the model for decolonization policy but, for now, that 
does not indicate that decolonization policy is not a viable method of decolonizing. My hope is 
that this study will prompt future research into the implementation of some of these policies. 
Many of the Morales administration’s policies could benefit from thorough impact evaluations, 
especially ones that focus on the social inclusion of indigenous peoples.  
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